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Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: "Rational Objects
of Disfavor" as a New Weapon in Modern Civil
Rights Litigation
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'
As the debate over the morality of abortion rages on in classrooms,
churches, and legislatures throughout the country,2 women in cities
throughout America are under siege. Between 1977 and 1990, the National
Abortion Federation (NAF) collected reports of 829 acts of violence di-
rected at abortion clinics: "34 were bombed, 52 were targets of arson, 43
were targets of attempted bombings and arson,"3 266 were invaded,4 269
were vandalized, and 22 were burglarized.5 In addition, there were 64 re-
ports of assault and battery, 77 death threats and 2 kidnappings.6 Just this
year, the violence at abortion clinics escalated to include one murder7 and
one attempted murder.'
A tactic anti-abortion activists increasingly use is to assemble large
groups of protesters who converge unexpectedly on selected women's
health clinics to form a human blockade, preventing patients, doctors, and
nurses from gaining access to the clinic.9 In many cases, these "rescuers"
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (plurality opinion).
2. For a thorough discussion of the history of the abortion debate in this country and abroad,
the legislative treatment of abortion, and the judicial responses thereto, see generally LAURENCE
H. TREBE, ABORION: THm CLASH OF ABsoLUTms (1990).
3. Brief for the National Abortion Federation and Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. as amici curiae in support of Respondents at 4-5, Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985). These figures were compiled for and pub-
lished in the NAF databases INcNmTS OF VIOLENCE & DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVID.
mRs and Arrn-ABoR'ION VIOLENCE: INcDmENs OF ARSONS, BomlNos & ATr Mvrrs, 1977-1990.
4. For an example of an "invasion," see Brief for the National Abortion Federation and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. at 11, Bray (No. 90-985):
When Operation Rescue arrived [at the Vermont Women's Health Clinic], three of its
members, posing as legitimate patients, gained entry into the clinic. Immediately there-
after, a dump truck arrived, blocked the driveway and unloaded 54 shouting protesters
who invaded the building.
They knocked the clinic director to the floor.. . [and prevented him] from reach-
ing a telephone until they were sure that the lines had been cut. They joined together
with bicycle locks and chained themselves to the clinic's furniture and doors.
5. Id at 4-5.
6. Id.
7. William Booth, Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest; Alleged Gunman Calmly Surren-
ders to Police Outside Florida Clinic, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al.
8. Abortion Doctor Shot by Woman During Protest at Kansas Clinic, WASH. PoST, Aug. 20,
1993, at A17.
9. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va.
1989), afftd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part & vacated in part, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). In its literature, Operation Rescue defines "res-
cues" as 'physically blockading abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between abor-
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are so numerous and so well trained in tactics of delaying the arrest and
legal process that local law enforcement officials are overwhelmed and in-
capable of responding effectively. 10
In response to this rising tide of violence, women whose access to
medical care is threatened and citizens who support them have sought a
federal remedy that goes beyond, and provides more effective relief than,
the laws of individual states." In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 2 the Supreme Court addressed whether the actions taken by Opera-
tion Rescue and its members constituted a conspiracy "for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws," in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 13 Under that
section,
[I]f two or more persons ... conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immu-
nities under the laws [and] do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exer-
cising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
tionists and the innocent victims." Id. at 1488 (quoting OPERATION REscuE NATIONAL DAY OF
REscuE-OcrOBER 29, 1988 (1988)).
10. As an example, on October 29, 1988, demonstrators succeeded in closing (ommon-
wealth Women's Health Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia, for more than sb hours. Despite having
arrested 240 rescuers, the town's 30-member police force was unable to keep the clinic open. Id.
at 1489 n.4. Tactics employed by the demonstrators on this and other occasions to block access to
the targeted clinic include parking cars across the entrance and deflating their tires, and scattering
nails on the parking lot and adjoining public streets. Id. at 1489-90. In addition, once arrested,
rescuers often refuse to give their real names to police, forcing law enforcement officials to re-
lease the protestors or to hold them overnight in crowded jails. Brief of the Attorneys General of
the State of New York and the Commonwealth of Virginia as amici curiae in support of Respon-
dents at 8, Bray (No. 90-985) (enumerating tactics employed by Operation Rescue demonstrators
and the effect of these tactics on states' abilities to maintain law and order).
11. See Brief of the Attorneys General of the State of New York and the Commonwealth of
Virginia as amici curiae in support of Respondents at 11, Bray (No. 90-985) ("[C]ompelling
reasons exist for securing this meaningful federal remedy in the arsenal of remedies available to
curtail and redress the harms of conspiracies such as the one at issue"). See generally Elizabeth
L. Crane, Comment, Abortion Clinics and Their Antagonists: Protection from Protesters Under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. Ray. 181 (1993) (arguing that § 1985(3) is broad enough to
protect women who are physically deprived of their fundamental right to abortion and that to hold
otherwise would impose on women the almost insurmountable burden of vindicating their rights
through piecemeal state-law-based litigation).
12. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
13. Id. at 757-58 n.1.
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of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any
one or more of the conspirators.1 4
The Court ruled that abortion is not an irrational object of disfavor, and thus
opposition to it does not support an inference of discriminatory purpose
from disparate impact in this situation.15 Hence, the "class-based invidi-
ously discriminatory animus" that the Court has interpreted § 1985(3) to
require' 6 was not present in Bray.17
This Note explores the scope and potential effects of the "irrational
object of disfavor" test the Court used to justify its refusal to infer a dis-
criminatory purpose." Second, this Note analyzes the possible effects of
the "irrational object of disfavor" test on access to abortion after the 1992
landmark decision of Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 9 Finally, the Note
agrees with Justice Stevens's dissent and concludes that the Bray Court has
injected an improperly subjective test into civil rights jurisprudence and has
created a new weapon for those whose subjective prejudices and invidious
purposes can be masked behind a purportedly rational explanation.2 °
On November 8, 1989, the health clinics in Bray2' sought and obtained
a temporary restraining order prohibiting Operation Rescue and its mem-
bers22 from staging a physical blockade of abortion clinics in the Northern
Virginia area.23 On November 16, 1989, the United States District Court
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). This section is the surviving version of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), § 2, ch. 22, 17 Rev. Stat. 13 (1873).
15. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
16. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
19. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). In Casey, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the central
holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which recognized the right of abortion; the Casey
plurality held that states may not unduly burden a woman's right to abortion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2820-21; see also infra notes 137-45 and accompanying text.
20. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's view requires a subjective
judicial interpretation inappropriate in the civil rights context, where what seems rational to an
oppressor seems equally irrational to a victim."); see also infra notes 154-62 and accompanying
text.
21. The plaintiffs in Bray (referred to in the text as the "health clinics") were nine clinics that
offer abortion services and/or counseling and five organizations that "seek to establish and pre-
serve women's right to obtain abortions." National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.
Supp. 1483, 1487 (E.D. Va. 1989), afTd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part & vacated in
part, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). The NAF was dismissed
as a plaintiff for failure to identify itself or establish a cause of action. Id.
22. The defendants (referred to in the text as "Operation Rescue" or "Operation Rescue and
its members") were Operation Rescue, the sole organizational defendant, and six individuals ac-
tive in planning and orchestrating "rescue" demonstrations. Id. at 1487-88.
23. Id. at 1497. The district court specifically excluded from the injunction purely expressive
activities within the defendants' First Amendment rights. Id.; accord National Org. for Women,
914 F.2d at 586 (holding that the "[tihe district court was within its discretion in declining to
extend the injunction in a manner that would interfere with such expressive activity.").
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for the Eastern District of Virginia commenced a hearing for a permanent
injunction;24 four days later, the court granted the injunction based on 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the state law claims of trespass and public nuisance.'
The district court held that the health clinics and their patients, as "women
seeking abortion," constituted a subset of a gender-based class and, as such,
were protected by the statute.26 In addition, the court found that the pur-
pose of Operation Rescue's actions was to deprive, either directly or indi-
rectly, this class of the right to travel interstate for the purpose of obtaining
abortion services.2 Agreeing that "the activities of [the members of Oper-
ation Rescue] in furtherance of their beliefs had crossed the line from per-
suasion into coercion and operated to deny the exercise of rights protected
by the law,"28 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.29 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 30 and, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Scalia,3 reversed the lower courts' findings of liability under
§ 1985(3).32
Based on the premise that members of a "class" must share some iden-
tifiable ties other than their status as victims of the conspirators' disfavor,33
24. National Org. for Women, 726 F. Supp. at 1486.
25. Id. at 1496-97.
26. Id. at 1492.
27. Id. at 1493. It is well-established that "section 1985(3) provides no substantive rights
itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights its designates." Great Am. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979). "The rights, privileges, andimmnities that
§ 1985(3) vindicates must be found elsewhere." United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983). For this reason, the health clinics in Bray alleged that by infringing
women's constitutional rights to interstate travel and abortion, Operation Rescue and its members
deprived women of equal protection in violation of § 1985(3).
28. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd
in part & vacated in part, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
29. Id.
30. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991).
31. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Justice
Scalia's opinion. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 757; see also infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
Justice Kennedy issued a concurring opinion. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 768-69 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); see also infra note 45. Justice Souter wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769-79 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also infra note 45. Both Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor issued dissenting opin-
ions in which Justice Blackmun joined. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 779-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text; Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 799-805 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); see also infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
32. Bray, 113 S. Ct at 768.
33. Id. at 759. As previously explained by Justice Blackmun:
[Tihe intended victims must be victims not because of any personal malice the conspir-
ators have toward them, but because of their membership in or affiliation with a particu-
lar class. Moreover, the class must exist independently of the defendant's actions; that
is, it cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 850 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted); see also Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 935 (5th Cir.), cert.
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the Bray majority concluded that "women seeking abortions" do not qualify
as a class for purposes of the statute." The Court declined to answer the
question, which has divided the circuit courts since Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge,35 of whether § 1985(3) is broad enough to encompass the gen-
der-based class of "women. 36
Instead of addressing the gender-based class issue, the Court reversed
the district court's decision on the ground that the "class-based invidiously
discriminatory animus" necessary to satisfy the second element of a
§ 1985(3) claim was not present.37 To establish a class-based animus in the
Bray situation, the majority asserted that one of two propositions must be
true: either "opposition to abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a
sex-based intent, or... intent is irrelevant and a class-based animus can be
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) ('The class prohibited by § 1985(3) is thus defined by the character-
istics of those at whom the conspiracy is aimed, not by the beliefs of the conspirators.").
34. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
35. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
36. Bray, 113 S. CL at 759. Compare Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[Wlomen constitute a cognizable class under § 1985(3).")
and National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming
district court ruling that "women seeking abortion" is a proper class for § 1985(3) purposes), rev'd
in part and vacated in part, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993)
and New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360-61 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990) (holding that impeding access to abortion clinics violates the rights of
women to travel interstate) and Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[Section]
1985(3) extends ... to conspiracies to discriminate against persons based on sex ... .") and
Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding liability under § 1983 and § 1985(3)
for Commissioners' purposeful maintenance of pay disparities against the plaintiffs because they
were women) and Life Ins. Co. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[,]omen
purchasers of disability insurance are a sufficient class.") and Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175,
177 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding district court finding that plaintiff alleged a conspiracy directed
against her because of her race and sex) and Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584
F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that "[the fact that a person bears no responsibility for
gender, combined with the pervasive discrimination practiced against women, and the emerging
rejection of sexual stereotyping as incompatible with our ideas of equality convince us that
whatever the boundaries of the concept, an animus directed against women includes the elements
of a 'class-based invidiously discriminatory' motivation"), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S.
366 (1979) with Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. MeMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 794 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that, because the animus of the defendants' actions was directed at anyone who
contributed to the abortion process, the designated class of "women of child-bearing age who seek
medical attention from the MWMC" was "so under-inclusive as to mischaracterize the dispute")
and Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931, 935-37 (5th Cir.) (holding that "those people
who do not agree with the Society defendants' point of view" do not form a protected class under
§ 1985(3)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). See generally Mary F. Leheny, Note, A Question
of Class: Does 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3) Protect Women Who are Barred from Abortion Clinics,
60 FoRDHAm L. Ray. 715 (1992) (assessing the history and interpretation of § 1985(3) regarding
women seeking abortions); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Applicability of 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 1985(3) to Sex-Based Discrimination, 46 A.L.R. FED. 342 (1980) (examining the case law of
efforts to bring sex discrimination claims within the purview of § 1985(3)).
37. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
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determined solely by effect."38 Rejecting the second proposition, the Court
held that § 1985(3) requires an element of intent beyond a showing of dis-
parate impact.39 Citing Maher v. Roe4° and Harris v. McRae,4 which es-
tablished the constitutionality of government abortion-funding restrictions,
the majority concluded that disfavoring abortion is not ipso facto sex dis-
crimination.42 The Court then rejected the proposition that opposition to
abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based discriminatory
intent. The Court stated that "some activities may be such an irrational
object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be
engaged in exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an
intent to disfavor that class can readily be presumed."'43 However, because
"there are common and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other
than hatred of or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concern-
ing) women as a class,"'  opposition to abortion cannot form the basis for
an inference of discriminatory intent.4 5
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for injecting a new
and subjective element into the statute. He noted that "[t]he Court is ap-
parently willing to presume discrimination only when opposition to the
targeted activity is-in its eyes-wholly pretextual: that is, when it thinks
that no rational person would oppose the activity, except as a means of
38. Id. at 760.
39. Id. ("'Discriminatory purpose... implies more than intent as volition or intent as aware-
ness of consequences. It implies that the decisiomnaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group."' (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
40. 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also infra note 94.
41. 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also infra note 95.
42. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760-61.
43. Id. at 760.
44. Id.
45. Id. Justice Kennedy joined fully in the holding and reasoning of the majority. Id. at 768
(Kennedy, J., concurring). In his separate concurrence, he added that in the event of a law en-
forcement emergency, in which state and local officials are incapable of maintaining law and
order, the Attorney General of the United States, upon a request by the states under 42 U.S.C.
§ 10501 (1988), has the power to "put the full range of law enforcement resources at the disposal
of the State." Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Similarly, Justice Souter concurred in the majority's conclusion. Id. at 770 (Souter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). However, he argued that the district court's opinion im-
plied the conclusion that the health clinics had properly stated a claim under the second clause of
§ 1985(3), which provides relief against conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws," 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). Bray, 113
S. Ct. at 778-79 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the application of
this clause had not been explicitly argued before the Court and was not expressly relied upon by
the lower courts, Justice Souter would have vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded
for consideration of whether the acts of Operation Rescue are actionable under the prevention
clause of § 1985(3). Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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achieving a separate and distinct goal."'  He argued that a "finding that to
disfavor abortion is 'ipso facto' to discriminate... against women" is not
required in the Bray situation.47 Instead, he asserted that, whatever the va-
lidity of moral opposition to abortion, a sex-based intent can reasonably be
presumed from the "lawless conspiracy [by Operation Rescue] employing
force to prevent women from exercising their constitutional rights."4 In his
opinion, the class-based animus requirement of a § 1985(3) claim "is satis-
fied if the conspiracy is aimed at conduct that only [members of] the pro-
tected class have the capacity to perform."'49
In an argument similar to that of Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor
also concluded that the actions of Operation Rescue evinced a class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus.5 0 She argued that, unlike the word
"deny" used in the Fourteenth Amendment, "the word 'deprive' indicates
an intent to prevent private actors from taking away what the State has seen
fit to bestow."51 Section 1985(3) is therefore not to be construed in tandem
with the Fourteenth Amendment, but as a complement to it, operating to
extend its provisions to protect victims of private conspiracies.. 2 Justice
O'Connor would have held that "Griffin's element of class-based discrimi-
nation is met whenever private conspirators target their actions at members
of a protected class, by virtue of their class characteristics, and deprive
them of their equal enjoyment of the rights accorded them under law."'5 3
Understanding the Bray decision requires an examination of the his-
tory of § 1985(3) litigation and the development of the law regarding dispa-
rate impact and inferences of gender discrimination. The Ku Klux Klan
46. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Echoing this opinion, Justice O'Connor stated:
[In assessing the motivation behind petitioners' actions, the sincerity of their opposi-
tion cannot surmount the manner in which they have chosen to express it .... It is
undeniably petitioners' purpose to target a protected class, on account of their class
characteristics, and to prevent them from the equal enjoyment of these personal and
property rights under law. The element of class-based discrimination that Griffin read
into § 1985(3) should require no further showing.
Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In refuting the majority's second proposition, Justice Stevens
argued that the majority's reliance on Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), was misplaced. In his view, the
concerns raised by a statutory claim under § 1985(3) and those raised by a constitutional challenge
are very different and thus justify different results. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 790-91 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Consequently, he would have applied less stringent standards under § 1985(3) and held
that "classifications based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily discriminatory." Id. at
792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Act, as it now reads,54 was enacted in 1871 and was intended to apply only
to those tortious deprivations of rights "the animus and effect of which is to
strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights
as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights." 55
Despite the goals of the Forty-Second Congress, 56 the Supreme
Court's decisions in the decade following the enactment of the Ku Klux
Klan Act indirectly but systematically eviscerated the Act and rendered it of
little, if any, use to its intended beneficiaries.57 For more than eighty years,
the statute books containing this section languished on the shelves only to
have the Court, in the 1951 case of Collins v. Hardyman,5 8 revisit and rec-
ognize further limits on its possible use. Expressing constitutional concerns
about federalism, 59 the Collins Court held that a viable conspiracy under
54. For a brief discussion of the legislative history leading up to the adoption of § 1985(3),
see infra note 72.
55. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
56. The Ku Klux Klan Act was entitled "An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Rev. Stat. 13
(1871). As described by Representative Shellabarger
The whole design and scope of the second section of this bill was to do this: to provide
for the punishment of any combination or conspiracy to deprive a citizen of the United
States of such rights and immunities as he has by virtue of the laws of the United States
and of the Constitution thereof.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1871).
57. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects only those rights that are
derived from national, as opposed to state, citizenship. Id. at 78. By implication, the privileges
and immunities language of § 1985(3) would be similarly limited. Following the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases, the Court reaffirmed this holding in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876). In that case, the Court addressed whether § 6 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Rev. Stat 140 (1870), applied to a conspiracy to "injure, oppress, threaten and intimi-
date" two black men. The Court held that, because the duty to protect equality of rights is that of
the states, "[the only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the states do not
deny the right." Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555. The culmination of the Court's persistent limiting of
the language of § 1985(3) was the case of United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). In Harris,
the Court addressed the constitutionality of the criminal prong of § 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch.
22, 17 Rev. Stat. 13 (1871), which provided that those found guilty of a conspiracy to deprive
another of equal protection would be punishable under the Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14
Rev.Stat. 27 (1866). The Court held that, because the Act could be interpreted to make a federal
crime of any conspiracy by two or more persons to violate another's rights to equal protection
under state law, the act was not warranted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Harris, 106 U.S. at
640. Thus, following Harris, a conspiracy under § 1985(3) would not only have to involve a
violation of a narrow subset of rights arising from national citizenship, it also would have to be the
result of state action that operated to deny citizens equal protection. See id. For a more detailed
discussion of the enactment and judicial history of § 1985(3), see Ken Gormley, Private Conspir-
acies and the Constitution: A Modem Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEx. L. Ray. 527,
541-46 (1985).
58. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
59. In Harris, discussed supra note 57, the Supreme Court struck down the criminal counter-
part to § 1985(3) as not warranted by any clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "is
directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the
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§ 1985(3) must include some state action or action under color of state
law.' The Court explained that "an individual or group of individuals not
in office cannot deprive anybody of constitutional rights, though they may
invade or violate those rights.""1 Consequently, purely private deprivations
have no bearing on the equality of the law unless they in some way manipu-
late the law or its agencies in furtherance of the discriminators' own
purposes.62
Following Collins, § 1985(3) remained dormant for an additional
twenty years before finally being revived in Griffin v. Breckenridge.63 Grif
fin involved a suit by two black men whom a group of white men as-
saulted. '  The two African Americans were passengers in a car driven by a
white man in DeKalb, Mississippi. 65 Mistakenly believing that the driver
was a civil rights worker, the defendants drove their truck into the plain-
tiffs' path and prevented them from passing.66 They forced all three men
out of the vehicle and severely beat them.67
Recognizing that the constitutional problems envisioned by the Collins
Court had not materialized,68 the Court ruled that, properly construed,
State or their administration by her officers." Harris, 106 U.S. at 640. Similarly, the Collins
Court argued that applying the civil remedies provision of § 1985(3) to purely private conspiracies
would raise constitutional problems of "congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth
Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as
distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to
those two classes of rights." Collins, 341 U.S. at 659.
60. Collins, 341 U.S. at 661-62.
61. Id. at 661.
62. Id.; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("[TMhe action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of
the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discrimina-
tory or wrongful."); Harris, 106 U.S. at 643 ("A private person cannot make constitutions or laws,
nor can he with authority construe them.... The only way, therefore, in which one private person
can deprive another of the equal protection of the laws is by the commission of some offence
against the laws which protect the rights of persons."); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
554-55 (1875) ("The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment ... does not add any thing to the rights which
one citizen has... against another."). But see Collins, 341 U.S. at 664 (Burton, J., dissenting)
("Congress certainly has the power to create a federal cause of action in favor of persons injured
by private individuals through the abridgment of federally created constitutional rights. It seems
to me that Congress has done just this in [§ 1985(3)].").
63. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
64. Id. at 91-92.
65. Id. at 90.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 90-91.
68. Id. at 95-96 ("[1It is clear, in the light of the evolution of decisional law in the years that
have passed since [Collins] was decided, that many of the constitutional problems there perceived
simply do not exist.").
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§ 1985(3) encompasses wholly private conspiracies.69 The Court identified
four elements of a § 1985 cause of action: (1) a conspiracy (2) for the pur-
pose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons of
equal protection or equal privileges and immunities (3) in which some ac-
tion is taken in furtherance of the conspiracy and (4) results in some in-jury.70 However, the Court recognized that the statute was not meant to
apply to "all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of
others."71 To avoid creating an unconstitutionally broad general federal tort
law, the Court interpreted the third requirement to mean that "there must be
some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus behind the conspirators' action."72 The question addressed by the
Bray Court, then, was whether the actions of Operation Rescue manifested
such an animus.
69. Id. at 96 ("Little reason remains, therefore, not to accord the words of the statute their
apparent meaning.... On their face, the words of the statute fully encompass the conduct of
private persons.").
70. Id. at 102-03.
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id. at 102. The original version of § 2 of the 1871 Act did not include the focus on
animus that is implicit in the equal protection language of the adopted version. As originally
introduced in the House of Representatives, § 2 provided:
If two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, or conspire, or com-
bine together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of another
person, which being committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute
the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury,
subordination of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of officers in
discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties to said
conspiracy or combination shall do any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to
or engaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or accessories, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be liable, &c., and the
crime shall be punishable as such in the courts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68-69 (1871).
In the debates leading up to the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act, many members of
Congress expressed concerns that § 2 was too broad and constituted an unconstitutional invasion
into areas traditionally governed by state law. To alleviate these concerns, Congress amended the
section to include the equal protection language found in the adopted version. The effect of this
amendment was to limit the statute's application to "those conspiracies which threatened the equal
protection of certain classes of individuals," id., and to give rise to the requirement, established in
Griffin, that the conspiracy be motivated by a "class-based invidiously discriminatory animus"
See Gormley, supra note 57, at 537-39.
In United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), the Court elaborated
on this standard and added a caveat to the application of § 1985(3) to private conspiracies. Under
the Carpenters Court's formulation, a conspiracy in violation of § 1985(3), in addition to mani-
festing a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus, must also be "aimed at interfering with
rights constitutionally protected against private, as well as official, encroachment." Id. at 833.
The Bray Court held that the health clinics did not satisfy this requirement. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
764. An analysis of that portion of the Court's decision is beyond the scope of this Note.
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In addition to understanding the evolution of § 1985(3), full compre-
hension of Bray's significance also requires an examination of the Court's
historical approach to gender discrimination. The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees individuals equal treatment by the state. 73 Although the Consti-
tution allows states to classify persons and treat them differently in further-
ance of state interests,74 it limits the extent to which these classifications
may be based upon immutable characteristics such as race,7' sex,76 and
alienage.77 Moreover, once a state enacts apparently neutral laws, it must
administer and enforce them equally.78 In general, when it can be shown
that a particular statute adversely affects a protected class, a court under-
takes a two-fold inquiry to determine if the statutory classification is indeed
class-based. The court first examines whether an impermissible classifica-
tion appears on the face of the statute; if not, the court determines whether
the adverse effects reflect invidious discrimination.79 In assessing the sec-
ond factor, the Court has recognized that a law inevitably affecting an iden-
tifiable class in an adverse manner may create an inference that those
73. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits each state from "deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNT. amend. XIV, § 2. As
interpreted by the Court, this amendment affords no relief against private discrimination not in-
volving state action. See, e.g., Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 831; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
755 (1966); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643
(1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
74. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1976); United States v. Maryland Say. Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6
(1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). However, it should be noted that
the rights of states to classify persons and treat them differently is not unlimited. At the lowest
level of scrutiny, a showing that "there are plausible reasons for Congress' action" is enough to
satisfy the Constitution. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 305 (1978) (holding
that "racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect" and that "in order to justify
the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitu-
tionally permissible and substantial, and that the use of the classification is necessary to the ac-
complishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interests") (internal quotations omitted).
76. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (requiring that a "gender-based dif-
ference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective").
77. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977):
[C]lassifications by a State that are based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny. In undertaking this scrutiny, the governmental interest
claimed to justify the discrimination is to be carefully examined in order to determine
whether that interest is legitimate and substantial, and inquiry must be made whether the
means adopted to achieve the goal are necessary and precisely drawn.
Id. at 7 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
79. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470
(1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76
(1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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effects were intended.8" However, in deference to the well-settled rule that
"the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results,"'" the
Court has often refused to infer an invidious purpose when a rational expla-
nation for the classification can be advanced. 2
In applying this equal protection analysis to gender discrimination, the
Court has only recently recognized gender as a protected class.83 Prior to
Reed v. Reed,84 classifications based on gender were considered valid even
when unrelated to the individual's capacity to participate in a particular
activity. 5 As Justice Brennan stated, "There can be no doubt that our Na-
tion has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Tradi-
tionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in
a cage."8 6 After vacillating among standards for a five-year period follow-
80. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.25 ("Certainly, when [there are] adverse consequences of a
law upon an identifiable group ... [,] a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired can
reasonably be drawn.").
81. Id. at 273; see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) ("[O]fficial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it
results in racially disproportionate impact."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
("[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act ... is unconstitu-
tional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.").
82. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279; Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270; Wash-
ington, 426 U.S. at 246. For a criticism of the purpose test, see Charles R. Lawrence H, The Id,
The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rv. 317
(1987). Professor Lawrence argues that to accomplish the goal of eradicating racial discrimina-
tion, the law must take into account unconscious racism. As an alternative to the purpose test, he
proposes a "cultural meaning" test that would "evaluate governmental conduct to determine
whether it conveys a symbolic message to which the culture attaches racial significance." Id. at
324.
83. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76-77 (1971); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99
(1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
84. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. This is not to say that sex-based classifications were not subject to constitutional scrutiny.
Prior to Reed, gender classifications were accorded scrutiny under the rational basis test, but were
routinely found to be valid. A good example of the traditional obstacles faced by women when
trying to seek redress for unequal treatment is found in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1872), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state court decision denying a woman a license
to practice law. In his well-known concurring opinion, Justice Bradley stated:
[Tihe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea
of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband.
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
86. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
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hig Reed, the Court appears to have settled on according gender classifica-
tions intermediate scrutiny. Thus, to pass constitutional muster, a
legislative scheme that differentiates on the basis of gender must bear a
substantial relationship to an important governmental objective.87 Under
laws that unequally burden women as a class, then, a showing of unequal
treatment without the furtherance of an important state interest may reason-
ably form the basis for a finding of invidious intent.88
In Geduldig v. Aiello8 9 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,9" a legal
distinction began to emerge on issues-such as pregnancy and abortion-
that affect women uniquely. In Geduldig, the Court upheld as constitutional
a California statute that denied disability compensation to women for preg-
nancy-related employment disabilities.91 On virtually indistinguishable
facts, the Court in General Electric held that the exclusion of
pregnancy-related benefits from an employer-provided disability plan did
not violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.92 In both cases, the
Court's holding rested upon the theory that women were
not being unequally deprived of rights or benefits that others enjoyed,
but rather were being denied additional benefits for additional risks.93
87. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (invoking a standard of substantial relation to the achievement
of the statutory objective); Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 651 (implying that a law must be rationally
related to the purpose of the legislation); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682 ("[C]lassifications based
upon sex... are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.");
Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77 (requiring a rational relationship to a state objective); see also Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (requiring a "close and substantial relationship to
important governmental objectives").
88. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690 (holding that a statutory scheme that presumptively
denies dependent status for husbands of female military personnel could not be justified based
upon a purpose of "administrative convenience"); Reed, 404 U.S. at 77 (holding that a purpose to
eliminate one point of controversy between persons equally entitled to administer an estate is
insufficient to justify establishment of absolute preferences on the basis of sex). But see Feeney,
442 U.S. at 279-80 (holding that a purpose of assisting veterans overrides an inference of discrimi-
natory purpose for a veterans preference statute that unequally burdens women).
89. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
90. 429 U.S. 125 (1976)
91. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497.
92. General Electric, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
93, In Geduldig, the State of California asserted an interest in providing the broadest possible
disability benefit program while at the same time maintaining an affordable rate structure. It
argued that inclusion of pregnancy benefits would render it unable to maintain the program on a
wholly employee-funded basis and would force it to raise its maximum annual contribution rate.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 493-94. In upholding the statute, the Court ruled:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility be-
cause of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list
of compensable disabilities.... Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition.
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This distinction was later sustained in the abortion context in Maher v.
Roe94 and Harris v. McRae.95
In contrast to discrimination through state action, private discrimina-
tion is noi a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.96 For individual, pri-
vate acts of discrimination to be actionable, they must fall within a statutory
prohibition (like § 1985(3)) or violate constitutional rights protected from
private as well as state action.97 Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for example, a classification that results in disparate impact, if not
shown to be rationally justified on non-discriminatory grounds, gives rise to
a presumption of invidious intent.9"
Id. at 497 n.20; accord General Electric, 429 U.S. at 145-46.
Notably, Congress has superseded the reasoning of both Geduldig and General Electric by
statute. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983). In
1978, Congress responded to these decisions by amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 "to prohibit sex discrimination of the basis of pregnancy." Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). In pertinent part, the Act reads:
"[Women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work." Id.
94. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Maher, the plaintiffs challenged a Connecticut regulation that
funded childbirth but denied funding for abortions except in cases of medical necessity. Id. at
466-67. The Court held that the state, merely by encouraging an alternative to abortion, did not
place a burden on the women's right to abortion. Id. at 474. Hence, the regulation was constitu-
tional based upon its rational relationship to the state's constitutionally permissible purpose of
encouraging childbirth. Id. at 478-79.
95. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The plaintiffs in Harris argued that, even though the so-called Hyde
Amendment, 93 Stat. 662 (1979), to Subchapter XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a-u (1988 & Supp. EI 1992), denies federal reimbursement for state-funded abortions,
states participating in the Medicaid program are required to fund medically necessary abortions.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 301. Citing Maher's recognition of "the basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy," Maher, 432 U.S. at 475-76, the Court found that "tihe Hyde Amend-
ment ... places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy, but rather... encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest." Harris,
448 U.S. at 315.
96. See supra note 73.
97. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830 (1983) (hold-
ing that a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights is not within § 1985(3) in the absence of
state action); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (holding that the rights created by
the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to interstate travel are protected from private as well as
official infringement). For an example of rights protected by statute, see Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1998)).
98. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). In Griggs, a group of
African-American employees sued Duke Power Company, alleging that the company's practice of
requiring potential employees to pass literacy tests disproportionately excluded African Ameri-
cans from the employment pool and therefore discriminated against them in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-2 (1988). Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26. Hold-
ing that the literacy tests constituted a violation of Title VII, the Court stated:
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.
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Against this backdrop of cases, the Bray Court addressed whether a
conspiracy by private individuals to prevent others from gaining access to
abortion clinics constitutes an invidious purpose.99 To determine the exist-
ence of a "class-based invidiously discriminatory animus," two questions
must be answered: first, were the conspirators' motivations class-based,1"'
and second, were they invidiously discriminatory?
Despite the ostensible clarity of this distinction, the majority did not
separate the question of class-based targeting from invidious class-based
discrimination. Citing Geduldig v. Aiello,1°0 Justice Scalia found that,
although only women have the capacity to become pregnant and have abor-
tions, classifications drawn along those lines are not necessarily
sex-based. 10 The Bray Court seemingly argued that a classification is only
class-based if it is drawn along class lines with the intent to disadvantage
that class. In contrast, Justice Stevens, also citing Geduldig, asserted that
intent or motivation is irrelevant to the determination of whether a classifi-
cation is class-based."0 3 In his view, because the possibility of pregnancy is
an inherited characteristic that constitutes the primary difference between
men and women, 1°4 any classification of persons based on this characteris-
tic is necessarily gender-based. 0 5
That Justice Stevens' interpretation of Geduldig adheres more closely
to precedent is evident from a complete reading of the quote upon which the
majority relied: "While it is true that only women can become pregnant it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is
a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed and Frontiero."' 0 6
A sex-based classification is therefore a necessary but not sufficient ele-
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude [a class] cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited.
Id. at 431.
99. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759-62.
100. The question of whether intent is class-based is markedly different from the issue of
whether a proper class has been identified. The latter question is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a discussion of that issue in the abortion context, see Leheny, supra note 36, at 715.
101. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
102. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760 ("'While it is true .. .that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifi-
cation."' (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20)).
103. Id. at 787 n.20, 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. While not all women can become pregnant, the ability to become pregnant is a unique
characteristic of the female sex. Consequently, all those who potentially could become pregnant
are necessarily women.
105. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 787 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice O'Connor would
find that the conspirators' motivation is class-based when it is "directly related to characteristics
unique to that class." Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added).
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ment of invidious discrimination. In this light, Geduldig does not stand for
the proposition that pregnancy-based classifications are not all sex-based;
instead, it stands for the concept that only those pregnancy-based classifica-
tions that have as their purpose the imposition of additional burdens on
women are invidiously discriminatory.
10 7
After establishing that the motivation of a conspiracy was class-based,
the focus of a court's inquiry must shift to whether the conspirators' actions
evinced an invidious purpose.10 8 Because § 1985(3) requires an express
showing of intent,10 9 the majority held that, to find a class-based invidi-
ously discriminatory animus in the Bray case, the Court would have to find
that opposition to abortion reasonably can be presumed to reflect a
sex-based intent." 0 Although Justice Stevens disputed this express intent
requirement,"' he otherwise agreed that the health clinics were required to
prove conduct from which a reasonable presumption of invidious purpose
could be drawn." 2 Whether the conduct of Operation Rescue and its mem-
bers should give rise to a presumption of discriminatory purpose constituted
the key point of disagreement within the Court and formed the basis for the
majority's creation of its "irrational object of disfavor" test.
As an example of the activities that are "such an irrational object of
disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen to be engaged in
exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent to
disfavor that class can readily be presumed," the majority offered that a tax
on wearing yarmulkes clearly would be an impermissible, religious-based
107. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. The term "invidious" in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment claim means "arbitrary,
irrational, and not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose." BLAcK's LAW DICnO NARY 826
(6th ed. 1990).
109. In Feeney, the Court ruled that § 1985(3) requires an express showing of discriminatory
intent; disparate impact, without more, is insufficient to support a cause of action under the stat-
ute. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). As stated by the Court: "'Discrimi-
natory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It
implies that the deeisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse impacts upon an identifiable group." Id.
(citations omitted).
110. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760. The majority dispensed with the inference based on its "irra-
tional object of disfavor" test and further stated that, with the test satisfied, the Court would have
to find that to disfavor abortion is ipso facto to invidiously discriminate against women. Id.
111. Justice Stevens responded to the majority's position by arguing that the class animus
asserted by the health clinics only requires a reasonable presumption of sex-based intent. Id. at
787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens posited that "there is no reason to insist that a statu-
tory claim under § 1985(3) must satisfy the restrictions we impose on constitutional claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment. A congressional statute may offer relief from discriminatory effects
even if the Fourteenth Amendment prevents only discriminatory intent." Id. at 789 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The majority responded that, with § 1985(3), Congress has not done so. Id. at 760
n.4.
112. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tax on Jews.' Unlike that classification, however, the majority held that
abortion, the subject of what it considered a legitimate moral debate, is not
such an irrational object of disfavor that intent to disadvantage women can
be inferred." 4 The majority's explanation why an act to disfavor the wear-
ing of yarmulkes, an activity engaged in solely by Jews, is a religious-based
classification, while violent interference with access to abortion, an activity
engaged in solely by women, is not a sex-based classification, is unpersua-
sive. As Justice O'Connor noted, the majority's argument that Operation
Rescue's actions affect only those women who seek an abortion and there-
fore result in the relevant class being defined as "women seeking abor-
tions," an unrecognizable class comprised solely of the conspiracy's
victims, is facetious."' First, violations of the rights of those women who
seek an abortion does not just affect those individuals. Those women ar-
guably serve as mere examples to be used as pawns in a violent campaign
to deprive all women of their rights. Second, just as all women do not seek
or even approve of abortions, not all Jews wear yarmulkes. 1 6 The Court's
suggestion that disfavoring yarmulkes gives rise to an anti-Semitic animus
while disfavoring of abortions does not give rise to an anti-female animus is
logical only if one accepts the Court's rational object of disfavor test.1 7
The majority effectively stated that, for a presumption of discrimina-
tory intent to arise, the targeted activity must be a mere pretext designed to
disguise hatred of or condescension toward women, even if deprivation of
the activity would result in disparate impact."' If the defendants can ad-
vance a reason for disfavoring the activity other than ill will toward women,
they will defeat the presumption and no invidious purpose will be
recognized. 119
The problems inherent in Bray's irrational object of disfavor standard
become readily apparent upon an examination of this test in light of the
Court's precedents and the test's possible scope. First, the requirement im-
plicit in the majority opinion-that the motivation of the conspirators' ac-
tions must be based on dislike of or condescension toward women-
extends beyond the traditional threshold test for gender discrimination. As
Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court has long held that ill will is not a
113. Id. at 760.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Cf. New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1360 (2d Cir. 1989)
('It is sophistry for defendants to claim a lack of class-based animus because their actions are
directed only against those members of a class who choose to exercise particular rights, but not
against class members whose actions do not offend them").
117. See Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 787-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 760 ("Inhere are common and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion],
other than hatred of or condescension toward ... women ... ." (emphasis added)).
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requirement for invidious intent; any alternative that unequally deprives
women of rights because they are women is discriminatory, regardless of
the actor's subjective view toward women. 20 Since only women can have
abortions, it seems nonsensical to argue that Operation Rescue does not
select its targets because they are women. Moreover, even under the major-
ity's slightly higher standard, the Court offered no response to Justice
Steven's assertion in dissent that, at a minimum, Operation Rescue's
actions manifested the invidious and condescending belief that women are
not capable of deciding for themselves whether to terminate their
pregnancies. 2 1
The second and most threatening problem with the Bray decision is its
subjectivity. In General Electric,22 the Court ruled that a distinction which
is not sex-related on its face may still violate the Fourteenth Amendment if
it is a mere pretext for invidious gender discrimination. 23 However, in that
case, as in Geduldig,"24 the Court ruled that the differentiations at issue did
not amount to sex discrimination. 1' As discussed above, both cases in-
volved the permissibility of denials of insurance benefits for preg-
nancy-related disabilities.'26 Pregnancy, in this sense, was not a basis for
placing additional burdens on women. Instead, the Court treated it purely
as a condition comparable to any other disease or disability and thus con-
cluded that pregnant women were merely being denied additional benefits
for additional risks.'27 Because the state had legitimate and rationally justi-
fiable reasons for excluding pregnancy from its risk pool and because the
120. See id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While ill will or condescension toward women are
traditional examples of invidious intent, they are not required. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). A
showing that the actor intentionally disadvantaged a particular class on account of its class charac-
teristics without a justifiable reason is sufficient. Cf. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies ... that the [discriminator] ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group."); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91
(1973) ("[B]y according differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed
services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience," the statutory scheme in-
vidiously discriminated on the basis of sex. (emphasis added)).
121. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
122. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
123. Id. at 136.
124. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
125. General Electric, 429 U.S. at 137-38; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
126. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
127. General Electric, 429 U.S. at 136. In explaining this decision, the Court stated:
[W]e have no question of excluding a disease or disability comparable in all other
respects to covered diseases or disabilities and yet confined to the members of one race
or sex. Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly
different from the typical covered disease or disability.
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exclusion was not shown to be a disguise for impermissible purposes, the
Court presumed no discriminatory intent. 2 '
By failing to recognize the distinction between Geduldig and General
Electric and cases such as Reed and Frontiero, in which the classifications
resulted in the imposition of a burden based on gender, the majority in Bray
misapplied the pretext argument. One reason why the logic of Geduldig
and General Electric does not apply in the Bray situation is that the actions
taken by Operation Rescue and its members were not gender-neutral; direct
deprivation of the right to abortion, unlike indirect discouragement of abor-
tion by denial of insurance benefits, places a direct burden on women that
men do not share.' 29 The classification is therefore sex-based on its face,
and the pretext question would not be reached under the Geduldig/General
Electric test.
More importantly, the Court has historically limited the grounds recog-
nized as "rational" justifications for particular constitutional or statutory
classifications to economic rationales or to showings that the characteristic
forming the basis of the classification bears some empirical relationship to
the ability to perform the activity in question. 3 In the Bray decision, how-
ever, even granting that opposition to abortion may be an acceptable social
view, the Court made a purely subjective, moral determination of what con-
stitutes a "rational object of disfavor" sufficient to defeat an argument of
pretext.
In responding to the majority, Justice Stevens recognized the subjec-
tive nature of this standard and the problems such a standard creates.' 3 1
After all, opposition to desegregation and to African-American and wo-
men's suffrage was once considered rational.' 32 Under the majority's test,
what is a rational object of disfavor may change at any time based solely
128. Id. at 135-36; Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97.
129. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by childcare. There is also the distress, for all con-
cerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
Id.
130. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,478-80 (1977) (indicating that the economic justi-
fication of subsidizing costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth);
cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (noting that the failure of an employer to
show a manifest relationship between a literacy test and job performance will result in a finding of
discrimination by the employer).
131. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




upon the popular views of society or the ideological make-up of the Court.
In the civil rights arena, such a standard renders the law unpredictable and
relative and threatens the very concept embodied in our Constitution that
there is a set of objective legal principles and fundamental rights with
which all other laws must be consistent.
A third problem with the majority's reasoning in Bray is that it does
not differentiate between the per se opposition to abortion and the active
and physical deprivation of access to abortion. The Bray Court stated that
the means by which Operation Rescue sought to express its views were
irrelevant to the determination of discriminatory intent.133 Both Justice Ste-
vens and Justice O'Connor disagreed.' According to Justice O'Connor,
"[T]he deliberate decision to isolate members of a vulnerable group and
physically prevent them from conducting a legitimate activity cannot be
irrelevant in assessing motivation."' 35 In spite of the "rationality" of the
object of disfavor, she opined that it is not "rational" to employ violent and
illegal means to bypass the legal system and force one's views on others. 136
The relevant language here is that the intent must be to deprive another
of equal rights. An invidious belief that is not acted upon does not fall
within § 1985(3) because it does not result in a purposeful deprivation of
another's rights. On the other hand, a conspiracy that targets its victims
along class lines and acts to prevent that class from exercising its rights
evinces an intent to deprive of equal protection.
Although the right to abortion itself was not at issue in Bray, the deci-
sion's potential effects on that right are great. The most recent statement of
the Court's position on abortion rights is found in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.137 At issue in that case were five key provisions of a Pennsylvania
law designed to discourage abortions by making them more difficult to ob-
tain.' 38  A majority of the Court reaffirmed the central tenet of Roe v.
Wade'3 9 by holding that states may not prohibit abortions before fetal via-
133. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
134. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977)
(noting the "basic difference" in the constitutional equal protection analysis between "direct...
interference with a protected activity" and "encouragement of an alternative activity").
136. Bray, 113 S. CL at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. 112 S. CL 2791 (1992).
138. Id. at 2803. The sections involved were 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3205 (1990), which pro-
vides for informed consent and mandatory 24-hour waiting periods; § 3206, which requires paren-
tal consent for minors; § 3209, which required a married woman to obtain the consent of her
husband; § 3203, which exempts compliance upon a showing of medical emergency; and
§§ 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on abortion facili-
ties. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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bility. 14 A plurality of the Court, which included Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy and Souter, further determined that the appropriate standard to apply
when testing the validity of state abortion laws is that of undue burden.141
Under this standard, a state statute is invalid if its "purpose and effect is to
place substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking an abortion before
the fetus obtains viability."142 Finding that, for the most part, the Penn-
sylvania law did not unduly burden women seeking abortions, the Court
upheld all but one of its key provisions.' 43
As a result of the Bray decision, the rights reaffirmed in Casey may
become rights in name only: although states cannot place undue burdens on
a woman's right to abortion, women have no effective redress when large,
violent mobs do the same.'" Arguably, this result is contrary to the
140. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
141. Id. at 2820-21.
142. Id. at 2821.
143. Id. at 2831 (holding unconstitutional requirement under 19 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3209 that
married women obtain their husbands' consent before receiving an abortion).
144. Cf. TRIE, supra note 2, at 250. Offering predictions about the future of the abortion
debate, Tribe analyzed the potential impact of the then-undecided Bray case in this way:
[U]nless the 'undue burden' test is applied with sensitivity to the circumstances of
actual women in the real world, many burdens that from an Olympian judicial perspec-
tive might appear to be molehills are in fact massive obstacles to choice.... If Casey
concerned a woman's legal right to choose, Bray... addressed the street-level question
of a woman's practical ability to get through the clinic's door.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
It is significant to note, however, that the health clinics and their supporters have declined to
yield to the raging hordes of protestors ensconced outside their buildings. Soon after the Bray
decision, bills were introduced in both houses of Congress that, if they become law, will establish
a federal cause of action and make it a federal crime to
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injure[ ],
intimidate[ ] or interfere[ ] with or attempt[ ] to injure, intimidate or interfere with any
person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or any
other person or any class of persons, from-
(A) obtaining abortion services; or
(B) lawfully aiding another person to obtain abortion services; or
(2) intentionally damage[ ] or destroy[ ] the property of a medical facility or in
which a medical facility is located, or attempt[ ] to do so, because such facility provides
abortion services.
S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1993). The Senate version was passed on November 12,
1993. The House version has yet to be voted upon. See S. 636 & H.R. 796, available in
WESTLAW, BC database.
Additionally, on January 24, 1994, in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
No. 92-780, 1994 WL 13716 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994), the United States Supreme Court ruled unani-
mously that Operation Rescue and similar organizations may be sued under § 1962(c) of the
Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 (OCCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Scheidler, 1994 WL 13716
at *7. Under that section, the health clinics may be awarded injunctive relief, treble damages,
costs, and attorney fees upon proof that the protestors conducted their "enterprise" through a
pattern of "racketeering activity," such as "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping ....
SECTION 1985(3)
Forty-Second Congress's intent to prevent mob violence from accomplish-
ing the same discriminatory results that states are forbidden to pursue. In
the debates leading up to the enactment of § 1985(3), Representative Lowe
expressed this concern:
What practical security would this provision give if it could do no
more than to abrogate and nullify the overt acts and legislation of
a State? If a state has no law upon its statute-book obnoxious to
objection under the article referred to, but nevertheless permits
the rights of citizens to be systematically trampled upon without
color of law, of what avail is the Constitution to the citizen? 145
Extending the majority's holding beyond the abortion debate, the
weakness of the Court's logic appears from its own analogy. The Court
held that opposition to an activity engaged in only by members of one class
does not create a presumption of a discriminatory animus toward that
class.' 46 In defending that position, the majority posited that-under the
dissenters' view-if the law were to require rapists to be released from
prison upon their agreement to enter counseling, those who regarded rape as
an abomination and thus blockaded those clinics would be guilty of an in-
vidiously discriminatory anti-male animus. 47 When one analyzes the par-
allels of this analogy to the abortion arena, the majority's argument is
unpersuasive. First, a sex-based classification must be distinguished from
sex-based discriminatory intent.'48 Making classifications along class lines
is clearly permissible when done for a proper purpose. 149 Consequently, to
say that the rape-opposition group would single out men as a class would
not necessarily implicate the statute.15 0 Second, the purpose of the activity
must be to deprive the class of a protected right because of their class char-
acteristics.15 1 In the anti-rape group analogy, the "right" to psychological
counseling is not one protected by the Constitution in the same way as the
right to abortion. Furthermore, these men would be deprived of access to
counseling because of the activity in which they engaged, not because they
were men per se.
arson, ... extortion. . . . obstruction of State or local law enforcement[,] ... [or] interference
with commerce:' Id. at *3, *7 n.4.
145. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Lowe).
146. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760-61.
147. Id. at 761 n.4.
148. See id. at 787 n.20 (Stevens, I., dissenting); see supra notes 101-07 and accompanying
text.
149. See supra notes 74, 87 and accompanying text.
150. It is also important to note that, while only women can become pregnant and seek abor-
tions, the class of rapists is not necessarily limited to men.
151. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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In the abortion context, all women, regardless of whether they choose
to exercise it, have the right to terminate their pregnancies. 152 The effects
of physical impediments that deny clinic access to those who seek it are not
limited to those victims. The women denied access to an abortion are ex-
amples used by Operation Rescue to deter all women from seeking to exer-
cise their rights and, ultimately, to accomplish its goal of depriving all
women of that right.'53 In the majority's analogy, however, it is difficult to
imagine that any court would hold that all men have a right to commit rape.
Unlike denying women access to abortion, denying men who have raped
access to counseling infringes the rights only of those men who commit
rape; assuming that those denying counseling to rapists are not using the
men denied as "examples" to deter all men from counseling, such activity
does not threaten the rights of men. Consequently, the majority's implica-
tion that to despise and violate the rights of someone who has committed a
particular act does not give rise to an action under § 1985(3), while valid,
does not address the situation in Bray.154
A truly parallel situation-one to which the rape counseling analogy
would apply-would exist if the state were to mandate post-abortion psy-
chological counseling. To blockade those counseling clinics, unlike block-
ading abortion clinics, would not place burdens on the protected right of
abortion, and therefore would not implicate a civil rights question.
In its use of the irrational object of disfavor test, the Court indicated
that a class-based deprivation of rights will not give rise to an inference of
discriminatory purpose if the deprivation was based on a rational object of
disfavor. On the other hand, a class-based deprivation of rights will give
rise to such an inference if the deprivation is secondary to the conspirators'
real purpose of expressing opposition to or oppressing that class.155 Be-
cause abortion is a unique right available only to women, however, depriv-
ing women of that right necessarily has the effect of disadvantaging and
oppressing that class.156 The majority does not adequately justify why
these two situations should be treated as analytically different even though
the results are the same. In both, an identifiable, protected class of persons
is deprived of a fundamental right by illegal and violent means, and its
152. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992). This right is not unlim-
ited, however. Under Roe, as reaffirmed by Casey, the right is absolute during the first trimester
of pregnancy, but may be more strictly curtailed during the later stages. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
153. Cf. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va.
1989) ("[A]I defendants share a deep commitment to the goals of stopping the practice of abor-
tion and reversing its legalization."), aftd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part & vacated
in part, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
154. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 761 n.4.
155. Id. at 760.
156. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807-08 (1992); see also supra note 129.
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members are targeted as victims because of their membership in a particular
class.
In attempting to differentiate between these two situations on the
ground that, in one, opposition to the fundamental right is rational, the ma-
jority has overstepped the bounds of its role. The Court in Bray inappropri-
ately uses the same words as those found in precedents that deemed
classifications rational when they were economically justified or when the
characteristic singled out had a true bearing on the ability to perform a
particular task.1"7 By misapplying those precedents in Bray, the Court has
established that when, in its purely subjective wisdom, it determines that
opposing an activity of a particular class is socially acceptable-that is,
when the activity is "not an irrational object of disfavor"-there will be no
presumption of discrimination.15 Such a precedent has the potential to
form the basis for infinite varieties of oppression, so long as they are hidden
behind well-crafted "rational" explanations.' 59 To say the least, the stan-
dard used to define discriminatory intent in Bray is relative and purely sub-
jective. At its worst, it is a dangerous weapon that those with invidious
prejudices may use to oppress those whom they disfavor.
A better approach would be to recognize the synergistic relationship of
the class characteristics and the nature of the right being infringed. Only
when the purpose of the conspiracy is to single out a protected class of
individuals because of their class characteristics and to deprive them of a
constitutional right should the requisite class-based animus be found. 160
Such a standard would be consistent with the language of § 1985(3) and
would clearly fall short of creating a general federal tort law. Moreover, the
plaintiff's class would be defined along the lines of immutable and identifi-
able characteristics, not, as the majority fears, as the victims of the conspir-
acy's activities. Under such a standard, the singling out of women because
of a characteristic that distinguishes them as women-the ability to become
pregnant-with the intent to deprive them of their fundamental right to
abortion would be actionable. Blockading men's access to post-release
counseling to eradicate rape clearly would not.
157. See supra notes 89-93, 98 and accompanying text.
158. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
159. Id. at 788-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Robert Nelson, Note, To Infer or
Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
334 (1986) (arguing that courts should be able to infer discrimination from disparate impact).
160. Cf. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor,
"Griffin's element of class-based discrimination is met whenever private conspirators target their
actions at members of a protected class, by virtue of their class characteristics, and deprive them
of their equal enjoyment of the rights accorded them under law." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In conclusion, the majority in Bray stepped beyond its traditional test
of rational justifications for behavior that results in disparate impact.161
The Court moved into a realm where the standard by which conduct is
measured is a subjective determination of whether that behavior reflects an
assertedly moral premise held by some segment of society. By refusing to
rely on the more objective test of inferring discriminatory intent from pur-
poseful infliction of disparate impact, the majority threatens the ability of
disfavored groups to gain redress for violent and illegal infringements of
their rights and creates a judicial system in which arbitrary fiat and doubt
have displaced the concepts of objective legal principles and inalienable
rights. As Justice Stevens observed, the Court has failed to meet the test
put before it by the Forty-Second Congress. In his words, "In enacting such
a law as section 1985(3) for federal courts to enforce, Congress asked us to
see through the excuses-the 'rational' motives-that will always disguise
discrimination. Congress asked us to foresee, and speed, the day when such
discrimination, no matter how well disguised, would be unmasked." 62
SimRuu SNEL.oN HArUNG
161. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
162. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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